The Role of Public Policy Evaluation in Strengthening Institutional Accountability (A Comparative Analysis of Legislative and Bureaucratic Levels in Iran)

Document Type : Research Article

Authors

1 Ph.D. graduate in Public Policy, Department of Political Science, Faculty of Administrative Sciences and Economics, University of Isfahan, Isfahan, Iran.

2 Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Faculty of Administrative Sciences and Economics, University of Isfahan, Isfahan, Islamic Republic of Iran

10.22103/jogapp.2026.26414.1004

Abstract

Background and Objective: Public policy evaluation is a key instrument for enhancing institutional accountability and improving the quality of governance. However, within the governance system of the Islamic Republic of Iran, this mechanism has not yet been systematically institutionalized in legislative and bureaucratic processes and remains largely confined to procedural oversight. This study aims to explain the role of public policy evaluation in strengthening institutional accountability at both the legislative and bureaucratic levels and to identify the institutional mechanisms influencing this process.

Method: This study adopts a descriptive–analytical approach with a qualitative orientation and employs document analysis as its primary research method. In this regard, upstream laws and regulations, official reports of oversight bodies, and legislative and policy research documents are examined and institutionally interpreted within a three-dimensional analytical framework comprising policy learning, stakeholder participation, and institutional transformation.

Findings: The findings indicate that the absence of legal requirements for ex-ante and ex-post evaluations, the dominance of procedural oversight over impact-oriented evaluation, weak information transparency, limited public access to evaluation results, and the lack of an independent evaluation body have disrupted the policy learning cycle, weakened stakeholder participation, and undermined the transformative function of policy evaluation. Ultimately, this situation has led to the formation of a self-reinforcing cycle of institutional inefficiency and the weakening of accountability at both the legislative and bureaucratic levels.
Conclusion: The results demonstrate that institutionalizing policy evaluation in Iran requires the establishment of binding legal frameworks, strengthening the institutional independence of evaluation, enhancing analytical capacities, improving data transparency, and creating a structural linkage between evaluation results and decision-making processes. Fulfilling these requirements can transform policy evaluation from a formalistic tool into an institutional reform engine and a mechanism for strengthening accountability within Iran’s governance system.

Highlights

Extended Abstract:

Introduction

Public policy evaluation has increasingly been recognized as a fundamental component of good governance and evidence-based decision-making. By generating systematic feedback on policy design, implementation, and outcomes, evaluation enhances transparency, institutional accountability, and the overall quality of public decision-making. In many governance systems, particularly those influenced by New Public Management reforms, the institutionalization of evaluation mechanisms—such as Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA) and ex-post policy evaluation—has been considered a prerequisite for strengthening accountability and improving policy effectiveness.

Despite its theoretical and practical significance, public policy evaluation has not been systematically institutionalized within the governance system of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Existing oversight mechanisms predominantly focus on procedural, financial, and administrative compliance rather than on performance, outcomes, and societal impacts. As a result, evaluation remains largely formalistic and fails to contribute meaningfully to policy learning, institutional reform, or accountability enhancement. This situation has limited the capacity of both legislative and bureaucratic institutions to assess policy effectiveness, revise ineffective policies, and respond to societal needs.

The main objective of this study is to examine how public policy evaluation can contribute to strengthening institutional accountability in Iran. Specifically, the article aims to analyze the role of evaluation in two key governance arenas—legislative decision-making and bureaucratic implementation—and to identify the institutional mechanisms through which evaluation can function as a driver of accountability and reform.

Theoretical Framework

The study draws on the institutional accountability literature, which conceptualizes accountability as a multidimensional construct encompassing bureaucratic, political, legal, and professional dimensions. Policy evaluation plays a mediating role among these forms of accountability by providing reliable evidence, enabling oversight, and facilitating corrective action.

Building on this literature, the research adopts a three-dimensional analytical framework consisting of policy learning, stakeholder participation, and institutional transformation. The policy learning dimension emphasizes the role of evaluation in generating feedback, preventing the repetition of policy failures, and improving decision-making quality. The participatory dimension highlights the importance of transparency, access to information, and stakeholder involvement in enhancing horizontal accountability and public trust. The institutional transformation dimension focuses on the conditions under which evaluation can function as an institutional reform engine, including independence, analytical capacity, and enforcement mechanisms.

Methodology

This research adopts a qualitative, descriptive–analytical approach and employs document analysis as its primary method. A wide range of documents was systematically examined, including upstream laws and regulations, parliamentary reports, official oversight documents, and policy research materials produced by legislative and executive institutions.

The collected documents were categorized according to governance level (legislative, bureaucratic, and oversight) and type of evaluative function (ex-ante evaluation, ex-post evaluation, and performance oversight). Using institutional interpretation and conceptual coding, the data were analyzed in relation to the three analytical dimensions of policy learning, stakeholder participation, and institutional transformation. A comparative analysis was then conducted to identify recurring patterns, institutional gaps, and systemic constraints affecting the use of policy evaluation in Iran.

Research Findings

The findings indicate that policy evaluation in Iran faces substantial institutional barriers across all three analytical dimensions. In terms of policy learning, the absence of mandatory ex-ante and ex-post evaluations has disrupted the policy learning cycle in both legislative and bureaucratic processes. Policy decisions are often made without systematic impact analysis, and existing analytical reports are rarely integrated into decision-making. This has resulted in what the literature describes as the “paradox of policy analysis,” whereby analytical outputs are produced but not utilized.

Regarding stakeholder participation, the study finds that participation mechanisms remain largely symbolic. Limited transparency, restricted public access to evaluative data, and the absence of institutionalized consultation procedures have weakened horizontal accountability and reduced opportunities for meaningful public engagement. These conditions have contributed to declining public trust and a widening gap between policy design and social realities.

In the dimension of institutional transformation, the findings reveal that the lack of an independent evaluation body, the dominance of procedural oversight, and the absence of enforcement mechanisms have prevented evaluation from functioning as a catalyst for reform. Evaluative activities are often conducted by the same institutions responsible for policy implementation, leading to conflicts of interest and undermining credibility. Consequently, policy evaluation has become trapped in a self-reinforcing cycle of institutional inefficiency and institutional stickiness, in which ineffective policies persist without meaningful correction.

Conclusion

The study concludes that the failure of public policy evaluation in Iran is not the result of isolated shortcomings but rather the outcome of interacting institutional weaknesses across legislative, bureaucratic, and oversight systems. Without legal mandates, independent institutions, analytical capacity, transparency, and enforcement mechanisms, evaluation cannot fulfill its accountability-enhancing or reform-oriented functions.

To transform policy evaluation from a formalistic exercise into an institutional reform engine, the study highlights the need for comprehensive and multi-level reforms. These include mandating ex-ante and ex-post evaluations in legislative processes, establishing independent evaluation bodies, strengthening analytical capacities within public institutions, improving data transparency, and linking evaluation results to decision-making and budgetary processes. Such reforms can enable policy evaluation to play a meaningful role in strengthening institutional accountability and improving governance quality in Iran.

Keywords

Main Subjects


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